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THE EPISTEMIC AND MORAL DIMENSIONS OF FAKE
NEWS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Ashley Messenger*
“Fake news”1 is a concept that has garnered a lot of
attention. It is faulted for creating a variety of social problems,
contributing to political divisions in the U.S., and interfering
with elections in the U.S. and abroad.2 And as such, there have
been calls for regulation.3
With respect to the legal aspects of fake news, there are
two important points: (1) much of what is called fake news is
probably constitutionally protected speech. First Amendment
protection is not conditioned upon whether speech is helpful or
good. The Founders had other priorities in mind. But by
making a broad grant of freedom to the public, the Founders
also expected the public to behave responsibly. That means, (2)
the law must accommodate the broad conception of free speech
and also limit liability for those who attempt to engage in good
faith corrections of the record. In essence, the law must be
consistent with the epistemic and moral positions in which the
Founders placed government and citizens.

*

Ashley Messenger is Senior Associate General Counsel at NPR, specializing in First
Amendment and Media Law, and an Adjunct Assistant Professor at American
University.
1
“Fake news” is a term that has been applied to many different things, including
satire and genuine news reports that turn out to be incorrect. See, e.g., Mark
Verstraete, Derek E. Bambauer, & Jane R. Bambauer, Identifying and Countering Fake
News 5–7 (Ariz. Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 17-15, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3007971 (describing the
various categories under which fake news may fall); Edson C. Tandoc Jr., Zheng
Wei Lim, & Richard Ling, Defining “Fake News”: A Typology of Scholarly Definitions, 6
DIGITAL JOURNALISM 137, 141–47 (2017) (providing that fake news includes satire,
parody, fabrication, photograph manipulation, and propaganda). However, for
purposes of this article, I am using the term to refer to speech that purports to be a
true journalistic news report but in fact is intentionally falsified and/or simply made
up, and it is neither presented as nor intended to be taken as merely satirical. In
other words, it is an intentional lie that deceives the public. The motive may be to
make money, to support or oppose a political candidate or cause, or simply to fool
people. For these purposes, the precise motive is irrelevant insofar as the purpose is
not to promote the truth or attempt to inform the public.
2
See, e.g., Morgan Chalfant, Denmark, Sweden Team up to Counter Russian ‘Fake News’,
THE HILL (Aug. 31, 2017, 11:03 AM),
http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/348693-denmark-sweden-team-up-tocounter-russian-fake-news.
3
See, e.g., Daniel Chaitin, Reporter: FTC Can Regulate What's Real News, What's 'Fake
News', WASH. EXAM’R (Jan. 30, 2017, 4:14 PM),
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/reporter-ftc-can-regulate-whats-real-newswhats-fake-news/article/2613392; Andrew Rettman & Aleksandra Eriksson,
Germany Calls for EU Laws on Hate Speech and Fake News, EUOBSERVER (Apr. 6, 2017,
9:29 AM), https://euobserver.com/foreign/137521.
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The purpose of this Essay is simply to acknowledge that
the First Amendment is structured in such a way that leaves
citizens responsible for upholding certain moral and epistemic
duties. In short, it does no good to call for regulation of “fake
news” because the Constitution makes the citizenry the
regulators. Our system requires the good faith participation of
citizens, and works only when they, in fact, participate in good
faith. To the extent that we are suffering the consequences of
fake news, we are suffering the consequences of the failure of
citizens to uphold the duties imposed by our Founders.
I. THE FRAMEWORK ESTABLISHED BY THE FOUNDERS
America’s Founders included the freedoms of speech
and press in the First Amendment because they wanted to
ensure that the Government would not attempt to control what
could be deemed “truth;” they feared the establishment of some
political orthodoxy that allowed some views to be expressed
while others were censored.4 The First Amendment, therefore,
removes such power from the Government:
“The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to
free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and
assembly, and other fundamental rights may not
be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections.”5
Over time, as the Supreme Court has had opportunities
to interpret the First Amendment, it has made clear that neither
truth nor morality are prerequisites for protection under the
law. Truth is certainly not required for protection: United States
v. Alvarez6 explicitly provided First Amendment protection for
lies (in the absence of some heightened form of harm), and New
4

See W. Va. State Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”).
5
Id. at 638; see also, Thomas Jefferson, 3rd U.S. President, First Inaugural Address
(Mar. 4, 1801) (transcript available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp) (“Sometimes it is said that
man cannot be trusted with the government of himself. Can he, then, be trusted with
the government of others?”).
6
567 U.S. 709 (2012).
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York Times Co. v. Sullivan7 provided protection to false
statements about public officials in libel cases (unless the
plaintiff could prove a heightened standard of fault).8 The law
also protects much speech that many consider morally
problematic: hate speech,9 indecency,10 and violence.11 In short,
the First Amendment is epistemically and morally neutral.
Fake news has flourished in this environment.
What’s important to remember, though, is that even
though the Founders wanted to limit the Government’s power
to control content or declare certain views to be “truth,” they in
no way intended for individual citizens to be epistemically or
morally neutral. On the contrary, the purpose of the First
Amendment is precisely to allow individuals to have access to a
wide range of views so that they can determine what to believe,
and the Founders assumed that citizens would strive to be
moral, rational, and truth-seeking. In fact, the framers of the
constitution explicitly stated that truth, science, morality, and
the sharing of ideas for the purpose of forming a common
understanding of the world and good government were primary
goals of press freedom:
“The last right we shall mention, regards the
freedom of the press. The importance of this
consists, besides the advancement of truth,
science, morality, and arts in general, in its
diffusion of liberal sentiments on the
administration of Government, its ready
communication of thoughts between subjects,
and its consequential promotion of union among
them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or

7

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 724 (plurality opinion); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80.
9
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444–45 (1969) (providing constitutional
protection to speech at a KKK rally); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396
(1992) (providing constitutional protection to cross burning); Synder v. Phelps, 562
U.S. 443, 448, 460 (2011) (providing constitutional protection to protesters with signs
saying “God Hates Fags”); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 867 (E.D.
Mich. 1989) (holding that university regulations against hate speech were
unconstitutionally vague).
10
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36–37 (1973) (granting constitutional protection
to sexual material that is not “obscenity” and establishing a high bar for determining
what constitutes “obscenity”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (finding
a constitutional right to possess obscenity in the privacy of one’s own home).
11
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010) (striking down a law that
prohibited the depiction of cruelty to animals); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564
U.S. 786, 805 (2011) (striking down law that banned the sale of violent video games
to minors).
8
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intimidated into more honourable and just modes
of conducting affairs.”12
With respect to finding truth, the Founders believed in
reason. Perhaps they were overly optimistic, but they assumed
that people wanted to know the truth and would examine facts
and ideas carefully. A free press was valued and privileged in
large part because of the confidence they had in the ability of
persons to discern the truth. They were familiar with
Aeropagitica, a 1644 speech given by John Milton, arguing for
the freedom of print materials without a license from the British
government. He famously stated:
“Though all the winds of doctrine were let loose
to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field,
we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting,
to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood
grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse,
in a free and open encounter.”13
Such sentiments were echoed numerous times by the
Founders14 and have influenced the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in favor of a free press.15
12

Continental Congress to the Inhabitants of Quebec (Oct. 26, 1774) in JOURNALS OF
108 (Worthington C. Ford et al. eds.
1904).
13
JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA, WITH A COMMENTARY BY SIR RICHARD C. JEBB
AND WITH SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL 58 (1918).
14
See, e.g., THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, VOLUME 33: 17 F EBRUARY TO 40
APRIL 1801 148–52 (Barbara B. Oberg, ed. 2006) (“[E]rror of opinion may be
tolerated, where reason is left free to combat it”).
15
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.”); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–72 (1964) (“[I]t is a prized American privilege to
speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public
institutions, . . . and this opportunity is to be afforded for ‘vigorous advocacy’ no less
than ‘abstract discussion’ . . . The First Amendment, said Judge Learned Hand,
‘presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude
of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection . . . Thus we consider
this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials . . . Authoritative interpretations of the First
Amendment guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any
test of truth—whether administered by judges, juries, or administrative officials—and
especially one that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker . . . The
constitutional protection does not turn upon ‘the truth, popularity, or social utility of
the ideas and beliefs which are offered’ . . . As Madison said, ‘Some degree of abuse
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789
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Moreover, the Founders expected citizens to participate,
to engage with one another in good faith for the purpose of
discerning truth and developing a civil society. As the Court
has noted:
Those who won our independence believed that
the final end of the state was to make men free to
develop their faculties, and that, in its
government the deliberative forces should prevail
over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an
end and as a means. They believed liberty to be
the secret of happiness and courage to be the
secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to
think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread
of political truth; that without free speech and
assembly discussion would be futile; that, with
them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate
protection against the dissemination of noxious
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is
an inert people; that public discussion is a political
duty and that this should be a fundamental
principle of the American government.16
The Founders also believed strongly in the importance
of personal virtue, noting that it was crucial to the functioning
of the Republic. State constitutions acknowledged that the
blessings of liberty were contingent on the good behavior of
citizens and officials alike. For example, the Constitution of
Virginia declared, “That no free government, nor the blessings
of liberty, can be preserved to any people, but by a firm
adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and
virtue; and by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles.”17
And Pennsylvania’s constitution stated:
is inseparable from the proper use of every thing; and in no instance is this more true
than in that of the press.’ . . . ‘In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political
belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields, the tenets of one man may seem the
rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view, the
pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who
have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false statement. But the
people of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the
probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to
enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.’ . .
. That erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected
if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . . to
survive.’”) (citations omitted).
16
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
17
VA. CONST. art. 1, § 15.
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“That a frequent recurrence to fundamental
principles, and a firm adherence to justice,
moderation, temperance, industry, and frugality
are absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings
of liberty, and keep a government free: The
people ought therefore to pay particular attention
to these points in the choice of officers and
representatives, and have a right to exact a due
and constant regard to them, from their
legislatures and magistrates, in the making and
executing such laws as are necessary for the good
government of the state.”18
Massachusetts had strikingly similar language in its state
constitution.19
The Founders’ assumptions that citizens would strive to
be thoughtful, rational, and moral may not have been explicitly
emphasized in the U.S. Constitution—presumably because they
were taken for granted—but those assumptions were
nevertheless built in to the idea of granting freedoms to
individuals. Although the Founders certainly anticipated
instances of abuse,20 they nevertheless chose a system where the
Government may not establish legally enforceable standards
with respect to speech and press. It is, instead, incumbent upon
the rational agents in the community to consider the epistemic
and moral dimensions of speech. In short, the Founders
established a framework that imposes some obligations on
citizens to live up to certain moral and epistemic obligations for
the sake of good government and a good society.
To miss this is to misunderstand the fundamental faith
the Founders had in human beings.They established a
government by the people and for the people because they
believed that the people, together, could aspire to something
great. The Founders had a hopeful trust21 in citizens—a vision
of a rational society that aspires to truth. The law therefore
needn’t force any vision of the truth because the people
themselves would aspire to it.
18

PA. CONST. § XIV (1776).
MASS. CONST. art. III.
20
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (“As Madison said, ‘Some
degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing; and in no instance
is this more true than in that of the press.’”).
21
For a discussion of the notion of hopeful trust, see generally Karen Frost-Arnold,
Social Media, Trust, and the Epistemology of Prejudice, 30 SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY 513
(2016) (Hopeful trust is when a person holds out a vision to another of what he can
be. It is motivating insofar as the audience aspires to act in accordance with the
vision of the kind of person/society he/it can become).
19
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Thus, the notion of government regulation of speech or
press fundamentally repudiates the vision of the Founders. Any
“regulation” is through the self-government of citizens who
bear their responsibilities to speak truthfully, to examine the
claims of others, and to correct falsehoods when required.
II. THE BURDENS OF THE SPEAKER
From a purely legal standpoint, speakers do not bear
many burdens. As noted above, the First Amendment has been
interpreted to protect a wide range of offensive, immoral
speech, including outright lies.22 Speakers may be liable if their
speech satisfies the elements for libel, true threats, fraud, or
other crimes or torts, but the degree of protection given to
speech is high. Thus, it is rare that speech will have legal
repercussions.
But despite the protection from governmental
consequences, the Founders nevertheless anticipated that
citizens would strive to adhere to rational, epistemic,23 and
moral norms,24 particularly the norm to tell the truth.25 Fake
22

Supra notes 6–12 and accompanying text.
Speakers have an obligation, as part of an epistemic community, to adhere to the
“norms of assertion,” which requires that a person assert only what they know to be
true. TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS 243 (Oxford Univ. Press
2000). This is to fulfill the epistemic goal of finding the truth. Id. Because much of
our knowledge comes from what others tell us, it is important that people be truthful
in their testimony.
24
The moral dimensions of speech have been addressed by many of the world
religions. The Ten Commandments, for example, contain at least two admonitions
regarding speech or communication: to not take the Lord’s name in vain and to
refrain from bearing false witness. Exodus 20:7, 16 (King James). There are arguably
two additional admonitions as well: the prohibition on graven images, id. at 20:4,
restricts expressive works, and the instruction to honor one’s parents, id. at 20:12,
may imply a restriction on speaking in a manner that reflects poorly on them. The
Quran instructs adherents of Islam to “speak justly.” Noble Quran 6:152. Buddhists
adhere to an “eightfold path,” which outlines eight major principles for practitioners,
one of which is “right speech,” a complicated ethics of speaking with wisdom and
compassion. See BHIKKHU BODHI, THE NOBLE EIGHTFOLD PATH 45 (2006).
Traditional Buddhist teachings, like the Abrahamic religions, prohibit profanity and
lying, but they also caution against gossip, “idle speech,” and statements that are
untimely or unwelcome by the audience. See id. at 49–56 (describing prohibited
speech). Likewise, Hinduism requires “pure” speech, which entails truthfulness and
kindness. LALA BAIJ NATH, HINDUISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN, AS TAUGHT IN
ORIGINAL SOURCES AND ILLUSTRATED IN PRACTICAL LIFE (1905) 209 (2010). In
short, most religions frown upon lying and abusive speech. While the First
Amendment certainly stands for the proposition that the government cannot enforce
the views of any religion, the Founders in no way required the population to be
devoid of religion or amoral. On the contrary, as evidenced by the language of the
state constitutions referenced supra notes 17–19, the Founders expected citizens to
adhere to some moral system.
25
Scholars have recognized that even apart from moral obligations, truth-telling is
fundamental prerequisite to any functioning civil society;trust is integral to social
coherence and prosperity, and our society breaks down if the system is compromised
by persistent lies. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES
23
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news presents both epistemic and moral problems, for obvious
reasons. If the stories purport to be true but are in fact false,
then, from an epistemic standpoint, they do not contribute to
either an individual’s or society’s body of knowledge—and
worse, they actually hinder the ability of a person or group to
determine what is true by creating doubt in the public’s mind
about which “facts” to believe. From a moral standpoint, it is
not acceptable to make knowingly false statements and present
them as true. And yet despite the epistemic and moral issues
with fake news, some stories may be wholly protected by the
First Amendment.
III. THE BURDENS OF THE AUDIENCE
Ideally, speakers will be honest in their speech, and
many are. But the reality is that we cannot always rely on
speakers to uphold their obligations, especially when there are
no legal consequences for the failure to do so. This places a
much greater burden on the audience to evaluate the truth of
assertions and to uphold epistemic norms. With respect to fake
news, the problem is not only one of the speaker lying, it is also
a problem of the audience being willing to accept the assertions
without subjecting them to adequate scrutiny.
What would constitute adequate scrutiny? There is a
genuine debate in the philosophical community about whether
or under what circumstances one should believe something
simply because it was reported to them.26 What is not debated is
that there are some minimum standards that must be met
before one should believe what is reported.
The kinds of factors an audience might evaluate to
determine whether a speaker is credible may include: “how
sincere and confident the speaker seemed in the assertion; how
well-placed she was to have the knowledge in question[;]” what
motives she may have had in speaking; whether the speaker has
any motives for insincerity; what pressure the speaker feels to
speak responsibly; whether the speaker looked the audience in
the eyes or seemed nervous; and whether the assertion made
sense or was supported by corroborating known facts. 27

AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY (1995);
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (2d ed. 1999).
26

SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN

See generally C.A.J. Coady, Testimony and Observation, 10 AM. PHIL. Q. 149 (1973)
(debating whether one should impose epistemic burdens upon those who hear the
testimony of others), see also, e.g., Elizabeth Fricker & David E. Cooper, The
Epistemology of Testimony, 61 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC., SUPPLEMENTAL VOLUMES
57 (1987).
27
Sanford C. Goldberg, Anonymous Assertions, 10 EPISTEME 135, 142 (2013).
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IV. THE IMPACT OF ANONYMITY
Fake news is often perpetrated by anonymous (or
pseudo-anonymous) individuals. While the First Amendment
protects anonymous speech, that doesn’t mean that anonymous
speech is entitled to the same degree of epistemic respect as
speech tied to a known person. If the norms of assertion include
an expectation that a person speak truthfully and that one will
be held accountable if one fails to do so, then naturally, a
person will be aware that he or she may not be held
accountable for lying if his or her identity is unknown.28 A
speaker whose identity is hidden is therefore inherently less
credible than one who speaks openly. The belief-worthiness of
anonymous assertions is inherently diminished.29
This is not an argument against anonymity in all cases.
Anonymous speech can serve an important purpose,
particularly when the speaker is subject to potential threats.30
There is a strong tradition of anonymous political speech in the
U.S.31 But typically, credible, persuasive anonymous speech
comes in the form of analysis or opinion, meaning it discusses a
matter of policy or conscience; it is not trying to report or
establish facts. The political brochures of the American
Revolution were arguments in favor of freedom, not purported
news reports. One can judge the merits of an opinion or
argument without knowing the speaker. One cannot judge the
credibility of a factual assertion without more information
about the speakers: are they generally credible? What is their
source? Are they in a position to know?32
When a speaker is anonymous, the audience lacks the
information required to capably assess these factors. Thus, “the
assertions themselves no longer convey that the speaker has the
sort of epistemic authority that would be needed to warrant
outright belief.”33

28

See id. at 136–37; see also Karen Frost-Arnold, Trustworthiness and Truth: The
Epistemic Pitfalls of Internet Accountability, 11 EPISTEME 1, 63–81 (2014).
29
See Goldberg, supra note 27, at 148.
30
See Frost-Arnold, supra note 21, at 69–70.
31
See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342–43, 357 (1995)
(upholding the right of a citizen to engage in anonymous political speech by
distributing unsigned leaflets and discussing the history of anonymous speech,
particularly in the context of political dissent).
32
See Goldberg, supra note 27, at 145.
33
See id. at 149.
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V. THE IMPORTANCE OF CREDIBILITY AND THE MODERATION
OF BELIEF
It’s important to remember that a speaker typically
speaks with the aim of getting the audience to believe what one
asserted.34 If that’s true, then the speaker should also want to
engender credibility, have a good track record for truthfulness,
be open about sources, and use one’s real name as a form of
accountability. This is what most legitimate news organizations
do, and these practices are often declared in a statement of
principles of journalistic ethics.35
Because source credibility is of such great importance,
news organizations are often reluctant to grant anonymity to
sources, and when they do, the news organization is essentially
vouching for the credibility of the source. They are in essence
saying, we have investigated the matter and believe the truth of the
assertion; the source is in a position to know, and we are not using their
identity to protect them, but we vouch for their credibility.36
One of the most vexing aspects of fake news is that some
citizens opt to believe stories or outlets that lack any indicia of
reliability, such as identification of verifiable sources, clear
standards of journalistic ethics, or long-term enforcement of
such ethical standards. The stories presented may align with the
audience’s personal opinions or political views, but otherwise
fail to present the kind of substantiation that should be required
before one invests belief in the matters asserted. Often,
individuals will complain that supposed “legitimate” news
outlets are biased or wrong, but even if one thinks the New York
Times has not met the requisite epistemic standard for
authority, one cannot rationally argue that an anonymous,
untested site does. It would be more rational to believe no one
and to suspend all judgment than to believe anonymous
assertions without transparent sourcing.
If “knowledge” is “true, justified belief,” then one who
wishes to have knowledge must care about whether that belief
is justified. Fake news can create belief, but it’s not true. If the
34

See id. at 139.
See, e.g., SPJ Code of Ethics, SOC. OF PROF’L JOURNALISTS,
https://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp (last updated Sept. 6, 2014); see also Goldberg,
supra note 27, at 143.
36
See Goldberg, supra note 27, at 150. Goldberg calls this the “security wall model”
of credible anonymous speech. Id. News organizations act as a filter, passing along
only those assertions that are credible, substituting their own authoritativeness for the
protected source. Id. This model preserves the belief-worthiness of the assertion
even though the original source is unknown. Obviously, though, this model requires
that the filter act sparingly and credibly, as it puts its own credibility on the line each
time it vouches for another. And those who do not trust the filter (for whatever
reason) will not trust the anonymous assertion.
35
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audience doesn’t realize the information isn’t true or hasn’t
evaluated whether the belief is justified, then people may think
they have knowledge, but they don’t—and that undermines the
quality of the decision making in our society.
When Milton talked about Truth grappling with Falsity,
he assumed there would be a conclusion to the grappling. In the
meantime, Falsity may have the upper hand, and that may
cause harm.
Thus, if the audience can’t be certain what’s true, at least
the audience can moderate belief. The audience must maintain
a degree of epistemic humility when new information is
received. It must be tested against other sources to determine
whether believing the information is justified. The audience
must account for the fact that some people make up facts.
Therefore, belief should be attenuated if one cannot be sure the
facts are true. This may mean that in the absence of
corroboration or clear evidence, one should suspend judgment.
We seem to believe that we must have an opinion about every
topic, but from a moral and epistemic standpoint, it may be
superior to refrain from forming firm beliefs and instead remain
open to new information. As Truth grapples with Falsity, one
needn’t call the match too soon.
VI. THE OBLIGATION TO SPEAK UP AND PARTICIPATE
As a corollary to that principle, those who do have
knowledge of the facts have an obligation to speak up and to
correct the record when necessary to prevent others from
believing false assertions. If in fact the Founders believed that
public discussion is a political duty, then it is incumbent upon
citizens with genuine knowledge to ensure that others are not
fooled by lies. One prominent scholar has called this a “duty to
object.” 37 It may be a social or normative duty, but it is not a
legal duty—nor could it be, because of First Amendment
protections.38 Nevertheless, the concept is consistent with the
position in which citizens are placed; theirs is the duty to
engage in good faith for the sake of civil society and good
37

Jennifer Lackey, The Duty to Object, PHIL. AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript available at
http://www.susannaschellenberg.org/REC/Program_2017_files/Lackey.pdf ) (“If
you report something that I know is false or unwarranted, or potentially harmful to
others, I may be required to say as much.”). In arguing for a “duty to object,”
Lackey notes that correcting false reports is an imperative with both epistemic and
moral dimensions. Id. (manuscript at 3). She also notes a moral duty not to be rude
or confrontational in doing so. Id. (manuscript at 22).
38
The First Amendment protects the right not to speak as well as the right to speak.
See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (protecting
the right of a newspaper not to publish a column).
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government, and that may mean correcting the record in
response to fake news. Moreover, “those who know more
about the situation have a greater obligation to weigh in than
do those who are ignorant of the matter . . . and those who are
regarded as an expert on an issue relevant to the case have a
stronger duty than those who aren’t.”39 I would add that not
only must one speak up when one knows a statement is false,
one must also speak up when one suspects that an assertion is
based on flimsy evidence, is being promoted for short-sighted or
self-serving motives, or otherwise may be epistemically flawed.
It’s easy to deny responsibility when one can say that they don’t
know for sure whether a statement is false, but allowing poorly
grounded assertions to circulate without challenge is equally
pernicious to the community as allowing false statements to
circulate because, in both instances, we fail to uphold the
interest in rigorously pursuing truth. Those who purport to be
leaders—in journalism, politics, or otherwise—have an
obligation to call out statements that are clearly false as well as
to call into question statements that require further
examination. It is particularly important for leaders to do so
when the statement, left unchallenged, would seem to help
them or their allies. Studies indicate that one of the greatest
indicators of credibility is a correction from a source when the
erroneous claim would have been in the source’s favor.40
But even if a dutiful citizen were to object to false
assertions, there is still an important, lingering question, which
is whether other citizens are willing to listen and engage in the
process of discerning what is true. We are all members of the
moral and epistemic community,41 but that begs the question of
what happens if some members refuse to participate. Our
constitutional republic was founded on an ideal of citizen
participation, and we place our country—and our freedoms—at
great risk when we don’t take seriously the responsibilities that
the Founders assumed we would uphold: civil, rational
discourse in furtherance of our moral and epistemic obligations.
39

Lackey, supra note 37.
Neil Levy, Nudges in a Post-Truth World, 43 J. MED. ETHICS, 1, 3 (2017) (“Thus,
corrections to myths about Obamacare that stem from Republican sources are
effective for liberals and conservatives alike; the fact that the claim is contrary to the
source’s interests is taken to be evidence in its favour.”); see also Lackey, supra note
38. Lackey also points out that one has a stronger duty to object to false assertions
when that person will be deemed to have more credibility with the audience. Id.
(manuscript at 30). In other words, Republicans who object to false assertions that
other Republicans would otherwise be inclined to believe have a greater duty to
speak up. The audience of “other Republicans” will be more likely to believe and
respect the word of the “speaking Republican” than they will of Democrats who
make the same point.
41
Lackey, supra note 38.
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Finally, because the Founders have placed citizens, not
government, in the role of discerning the truth, the First
Amendment must fully protect efforts to fulfill our obligations.
VII. THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS TO FULFILL OUR OBLIGATIONS
I have previously written about why the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence on libel law is flawed: the law currently
fails to account for situations in which one is advising the
public of a potential falsehood, not to perpetuate the falsehood,
but to advise the public on the controversy;42 and the Court’s
treatment of allegations of “lying” create potential problems for
those who are trying to identify falsehoods or correct the
record.43 Both of these flaws are highlighted when one
examines how journalists—or citizens—can discuss the
problem of “fake news.” Courts should account for the need to
point out falsehoods (or likely falsehoods) and therefore should
grant constitutional protection to speech that either reports on
falsehoods or attempts to correct a falsehood.
The realm of fake news makes clear a point I have raised
before: that libel law must account for the difference in
motivations among speakers. The republication rule—which
provides that ANY re-publisher is equally liable as the original
publisher—simply does not make sense in the context of fake
news. Those who originate or republish false statements for the
purpose of persuading the public that they are true should be
treated differently from those who republish the statements with
the purpose of advising the public that they are or may likely be
false.44 Similarly, the courts should be reluctant to impose
liability on a speaker who objects to the assertions of others.
There are a slew of libel cases where plaintiffs allege that they
are defamed as “liars,” because another has deemed their
assertions to be untrue.45 The courts need to provide substantial
protection to those who have legitimate motives to question

42

Ashley Messenger, The Problem With New York Times Co. v. Sullivan: An
Argument for Moving from A Falsity Model of Libel Law to A Speech Act Model, 11 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 172 (2012).
43
Leonard Niehoff & Ashley Messenger, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Twenty-Five
Years Later: The Slow, Quiet, and Troubled Demise of Liar Libel, 49 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 467, 468 (2016).
44
See Messenger, supra note 42, at 470.
45
See, e.g., Costello v. Capital Cities Commc’ns, Inc., 125 Ill.2d 402 (1988);
McNamee v. Clemens, 762 F.Supp. 2d 584 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); Daniel Jackson, SexAssault Accusers Turn to Defamation Lawsuits in #MeToo Era, COURTHOUSE NEWS
SERV. (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.courthousenews.com/sex-assault-accusers-turnto-defamation-lawsuits-in-metoo-era/.
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unfounded assertions, or who have personal knowledge of the
events in question.46
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Framers of the Constitution set up a system that
gives citizens immense power in the realm of speech and press
and requires them to adhere to moral and epistemic norms.
That system collapses if people don’t uphold their end of the
deal. The problem of fake news should be a wake-up call—not
for more government regulation, but for greater citizen
participation in the moral and epistemic community.

46

See Niehoff & Messenger, supra note 43, at 484; see also Clay Calvert, Counterspeech,
Cosby, and Libel Law: Some Lessons about Pure Opinion & Resuscitation of the Self-Defense
Privilege, 69 FLA. L. REV. 151, 171 (2017).

